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Articles

I

The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and the
South African Constitutional Court
Reynaud N. Daniels* and Jason Brickhill**
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative
act[]... it thwarts the will of representativesof the actualpeople of
the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalfof the prevailing
majority, but againstit.1
I.

Introduction

The South African Constitutional Court occupies an enormously
difficult position in society. It bears the burden of being the guardian of
the constitution, which entrenches socio-economic rights, but also
* Mr. Daniels is currently a partner at Cheadle Thompson & Haysom in
Johannesburg, South Africa. He received his B.A. from the University of Cape Town in
1992, LL.B. from the University of Western Cape in 1994, and LL.M. from Northwestern
University School of Law in 2006.
** Mr. Brickhill is currently an associate at Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys in
Johannesburg, South Africa and a Sessional Lecturer in Constitutional Law at the
University of the Witwatersrand. He received his LL.B. from the University of Cape
Town in 2003 and in 2004 worked as a law clerk at the Constitutional Court of South
Africa.
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).
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admonishes the judiciary to protect democratic values and the principle
of separation of powers. This paper explores the "counter-majoritarian
difficulty" at a unique juncture in South Africa's constitutional history, a
democratic nation only slightly older than ten years.
Part II of this article briefly looks at the establishment of a
constitutional democracy in South Africa. Part III broadly surveys
scholarly views on the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
Part IV
scrutinizes a few judgments of the Constitutional Court facing countermajoritarian hurdles. Although other rulings impact the debate, as would
a discussion on the role of the Constitutional Court in the development of
the common law,2 this does not prevent the examination of the judicial
philosophy that has flowed through some of the more significant
decisions of the Constitutional Court. In Part V, the following issues are
explored: (a) the extent of the counter-majoritarian difficulty in South
Africa; (b) the stance of the judiciary toward the counter-majoritarian
difficulty; and (c) the methods used by or available to the judiciary to
minimize potential conflict with the political branches.
Part VI
concludes that, although the Constitutional Court has gone to great pains
to position itself as an unbiased mediator, it has been faced with a
difficult challenge in upholding the constitution without treading too
heavily on the toes of the new, democratic parliament. The court has
done so largely on a case-by-case basis, and the real challenge for the
future is to develop a unified view of its institutional competence.
However, it is beyond doubt that constitutionalism remains fundamental
to building a stable and effective democracy in South Africa.
II.

Establishment of South Africa as a Constitutional Democracy

In 1948, the Nationalist Party (NP) rose to power through an
electoral system that enfranchised only white citizens.
The NP
developed the theory of separate development, which came to be known
as "apartheid," a rigid and cruel legal system created for the purpose of
"economic and social segregation. ' 3 The apartheid government was
2. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security & Another, 2001 (10) BCLR 995
(CC) (S. Aft.), and Du Plessis & Others v De Klerk & Another, 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC)
(S. Afr.), the court considered the development of the common law in accordance with
the South African constitution. The reform of the common law via the horizontal
application of the constitution may have implications for the counter-majoritarian role of
the court. Compare Michael Osborne & Chris Sprigman, Behold: Angry Native Becomes
Post Modernist Prophet of Judicial Messiah, 118 S.AFRICAN L.J. 693, 694 (2001)
(arguing "the model of indirect horizontality [favored] by the majority in Du Plessis v De
Klerk[,] ...with respect to the interim [c]onstitution, should and would continue to apply
in cases decided under the final [c]onstitution") with DENNIS DAVIS, DEMOCRACY AND
DELIBERATION 106-07 (1999).
3. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (10)
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characterized by a strong centralized government operating under the4
banner of parliamentary sovereignty and domination by the executive.
The system of apartheid was composed of a vast network of legislation,
regulations, and policies and buttressed by draconian security legislation
that extinguished all avenues of political dissent. With few exceptions,
the judiciary acted as accomplices to the apartheid project by deferring to
the executive on a regular basis.5
However, apartheid efforts at disenfranchisement of black people
were met, in addition to political protest, with some legal challenges.
Some of the most well-known judgments to emerge from apartheid South
Africa were delivered during this period. In Ndlwana v Hofmeyr,6 a
challenge to the Representation of Natives Act failed,7 the Appellate
Division basing its decision on the notion of parliamentary supremacy.
However, in the famous pair of Harris cases, the Appellate Division
twice struck down legislative attempts to disenfranchise blacks. In
Harris J,8 the Appellate Division struck down the Separate
Representation of Voters Act, 9 which provided for "the separate
representation of European and non-European voters in the Province of
the Cape of Good Hope."' 10 Outraged, the government sought to
circumvent the judgment by passing the High Court of Parliament Act, 1
which purported to turn Parliament itself into the highest court in
constitutional matters, with the power to review and set aside, by simple
majority vote, any Appellate Division decision declaring an act of
parliament invalid. The "High Court of Parliament" then declared
Harris I wrongly decided.' 2 Thus followed Harris //,13 in which a
unanimous Appellate Division struck down the High Court of Parliament
BCLR 1253, 1265-66 (CC) (S. Afr.).
4. Until the introduction of the interim constitution in April 1994, there was no
constitutional review of legislation. Laws could only be reviewed on limited technical
and procedural grounds, such as legality.
5. See Makau wa Matua, Hope and Despairfor a New South Africa, 10 Harv. HUM.
RTS. J. 63, 104 (1997); see also generally JASON BRICKHILL & RYAN BABIUCH, POLITICAL
RIGHTS, IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA ch. 45 (2d ed., S. Woolman, T.Roux,
J. Klaaren, A. Stein, M. Chaskalson & M. Bishop eds., 2002).
6. Ndlwana v Hofmeyr, 1937 A.D. 229 (S.Afr.).
7. Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 (S.Afr.).
8. Harris v Minister of the Interior, 1952 (2) SA 428 (A).
9. Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 (S.Afr.).
10. The basis of the decision was that the Act was not passed in conformity with the
provisions of the South Africa Act of 1909, the constitution of the day, which required
more than a two-thirds parliamentary majority, and special procedures, when legislating
to disqualify any person as a voter on the ground of race.
11. High Court of Parliament Act 35 of 1952 (S.Afr.).
12. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Demise of the High Court of Parliament in South
Africa, 66 HARV. L. REV. 864, 866 n.9 (1953).
13. Minister of the Interior v Harris, 1952 (4) SA 769 (A).
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4

Act. 1
The government then went back to the drawing board and used a
two-step legislative strategy, passing two acts by ordinary majority, in
order, first, to restructure parliament to give it the majority necessary to
amend the constitution; 5 and, secondly, to amend the constitution by
removing the constitutional protection of black voting rights.1 6 These
17
steps allowed it to re-enact the Separate Representation of Voters Act.
At the same time, the government passed legislation to increase the
quorum of the Appellate Division bench for cases concerning the validity
of legislation. The majority of the enlarged bench of the Appellate
Division then dismissed the challenge to these new statutes in the Collins
case.18 The only judge to dissent was Justice Schreiner.19
So subsided this brief period of judicial activism and opposition to
apartheid laws. Not surprisingly in light of this history, both judicial
legitimacy and judicial independence are fundamental issues in the new
democratic South Africa.
During the late 1980s, unofficial contact began between Afrikaner
elites and the African National Congress (ANC) in exile. In 1989, the
ANC pledged itself to democracy and constitutionalism with its draft
Constitutional Guidelines for a New South Africa,20 which reflected
popular aspirations for political and social transformation. At the same
time, the NP also began drafting a bill of rights for a new constitutional
dispensation. Its purpose, however, was the protection of elite minority
interests. 21
In February 1990, the NP inaugurated the transition to democracy
by lifting the ban on the ANC and other liberation organizations.
Although the NP and other ruling elites were prepared to surrender
power to the majority, they resolved to play a major role in designing the
constitutional structure and normative principles regulating the future
14. See Griswold, supra note 12, at 866.
15. The Senate Act 53 of 1955 effectively enlarged and restructured the upper house
of Parliament (the Senate) so as to give the government the two-thirds parliamentary
majority necessary to amend the entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act.
16. The South Africa Act Amendment Act 9 of 1956, passed with a two-thirds
majority, repealed § 35 of the South Africa Act, which protected black voting rights.
17. See Separate Representation of Voters Act 9 of 1956.
18. Collins v Minister of the Interior, 1957 (1) SA 552 (A).
19. In the view of many in the legal profession at the time, Justice Oliver Schreiner
was subsequently passed over for appointment as Chief Justice on the basis of his
dissenting views in cases such as Collins.
20. African National Congress, Constitutional Guidelinesfor a New South Africa
(1989), reprintedin 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 235 app. A (1989-90).
21. E. Van Huysteen, In Search of Hercules: Democracy, Constitutionalismand the
South African Constitutional Court (Advanced Soc. Research, Univ. of Witwatersrand,
Seminar Paper No. 410, 1996).
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government.22
Representatives of the NP, the ANC, and other political groups
began meeting in a multi-party forum, the Convention for a Democratic
CODESA fashioned a
South Africa (CODESA), during 1991.
compromise two stage process to democracy, establishing an interim
government of national unity under an interim constitution, which would
govern until the final constitution was finalized through a democratically
elected legislature.
The NP ensured they would have a say in the final constitution by
persuading the CODESA delegates to agree to a set of mandatory
Constitutional Principles (CPs) with which the final constitution would
have to comply. 23 Although the final constitution would be drafted and
adopted by a democratically elected constitutional assembly, it would
only become law after an independent constitutional court certified that it
complied with the CPs. Thus, the NP, who had a firm hold on power
during the negotiations of the CPs, ensured that its primary concerns
were safeguarded in the final constitution.
The interim constitution, negotiated primarily through CODESA,
was adopted by the white minority government and came into effect on
April 27, 1994, the date of the first democratic elections. The interim
constitution was negotiated by unelected delegates with no popular
mandate. It required that the final constitution be adopted by a twothirds majority of the24 members of an elected South African
Constitutional Assembly.
Following the 1994 elections, the newly established Constitutional
Assembly, in which the ANC held a majority of seats, set about drafting
the final constitution.
At face value, the drafting process was
characterized by massive public participation accomplished through
educational communications via internet, radio, television, and
newspaper and solicitation of written comments and verbal submissions
22. In re Certificationof the Constitution, 1996 (10) BCLR at 1268.
23. The CPs constituted a "solemn pact" incorporated into the interim constitution.
See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993 pmbl. ("[Iun order to secure the achievement of [a
new democratic order], elected representatives of all the people of South Africa should be
mandated to adopt a new [c]onstitution in accordance with a solemn pact recorded as
Constitutional Principles."); see also id. at sched. IV (listing thirty-four CPs).
24. Id. § 73(2). Section 73(5), when read together with sections 73(6) and 73(8),
provides that in the absence of a two-thirds vote of approval by the Constitutional
Assembly, the draft constitution could nevertheless become law by receiving fifty percent
approval in the Constitutional Assembly and sixty percent support in a national
referendum. However, the negotiating parties believed that failure to reach a negotiated
settlement would undermine investor confidence and be more "costly" for the country.
See Christina Murray, Negotiating Beyond Deadlock: From the ConstitutionalAssembly
to the Court, in POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S
BASIC LAW 103, 118 (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001).
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through a constitutional radio talk line. A nationwide survey concluded
that the media campaign conducted by the Constitutional Assembly
reached more than seventy-three percent of all South African adults and
that more than 2,000,000 submissions were made to the Constitutional
Assembly. 26 However, the drafting of the final constitution was formally
limited by the CPs, such as the recognition and protection of "collective
rights of self-determination. ' ,2' Accordingly, the compromises battered
out in CODESA, including entrenchment of property rights aad
collective rights of self-determination made their way into the final
constitution. It is not surprising, therefore, that the transition to
democracy is regarded by some as founded upon pacts between
adversarial elites.28
The final constitution establishes South Africa as a constitutional
state and provides that "[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the
obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled., 29 Guardianship of the
constitution vests finally in Constitutional Court: the final constitution
provides that the "Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether
a provincial Act or conduct of the President is
an Act of Parliament,
30
constitutional.

Unlike the American constitutional system, therefore, where the
courts' judicial review power was judicially discovered, the South
African Constitution establishes firmly the power of the courts to review
In light of this, the counterlegislation against the constitution.
majoritarian dilemma facing South African courts is somewhat
However, given the concerns around whether the
attenuated.
constitution itself reflects the popular will, the legitimacy of judicial
review remains a live issue in South Africa, both as a jurisprudential
question and a political reality.
III.

Nature of the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty

The counter-majoritarian difficulty relates to the tension between
the democratically elected legislature (which premises its authority on
the consent of the governed) and an unelected judiciary with the power to
25. However, the process remained at all times under the control of the negotiating
parties.
26. See Murray, supra note 24, at 107.
27. Carmel Rickard, The Certification of the Constitution of South Africa, in POSTAPARTHEID CONSUTTUTIONS, supra note 24, at 224, 226.

28. Glenn Adler & Eddie Webster, Challenging Transition Theory: The Labor
Movement, Radical Reform, and Transition to Democracy in South Africa, 23 POL. &
Soc'y 75, 99 (1995).
29. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 2.
30. Id. § 167(5).
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nullify the conduct of that legislature. As Bickel points out, it is difficult
to comprehend why the judiciary is better placed than the legislature or
executive to monitor their conduct.31
Before discussing the counter-majoritarian difficulty, a few brief
comments are necessary. First, legislatures do not inevitably neglect
minority concerns or make policy choices at the dictate of the majority.
Elections happen at regular intervals and only broad policy issues may be
debated at that time. It is said that the "insecurity of elective 32office
discourages nonjudicial officials from ignoring minority interests."
In any event, the judiciary is not obstinately counter-majoritarian,
especially since judicial appointments are never completely insulated
from political control and influence.3 3 Views held by judges are often
fashioned by the same changes in public mood and judges experience the
same shifts in political and social circumstances that impact public
officials. 34 Accordingly, defending a constitution reflective of the
peoples' fundamental values against legislation enacted in the heat of the
moment may be considered majoritarian.3 5
Many have struggled to rationalize why a nation, founded on the
consent of the governed, would bind itself to a constitution enforced by
an unaccountable judiciary when those constitutional pre-commitments
are intentionally organized such that they are difficult to alter.3 6
However, it is said that the real difficulty with constitutional judicial
review is not so much that judges are unelected, but that their decisions
are final save for an unwieldy constitutional amendment process or
judicial overruling.37
From this standpoint, constitutionalism is
portrayed as being fundamentally anti-democratic.
Justifying the counter-majoritarian role of a constitutional court is
not an easy task. It is sometimes said that the nature of constitutional
review is justified because of the institutional position of the judiciary,
which places it uniquely in a position where it has access to different
information, perspective, and incentives. 38 However, this argument
struggles to escape the charge that it is fundamentally paternalistic

31. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 4.
32. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 835 (2002).
33. Federal judges in the United States hold life tenure, but frequent judicial

vacancies give current majorities the gap to influence the composition of the bench. Id.
at 832.
34. Id.
35. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 25.
36. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1993).
37. Harry H. Wellington, Forewordto BICKEL, supra note 1, at xii.
38. See Whittington, supra note 32, at 833; BICKEL, supra note 1, at 25.
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(especially where the court fails to engage in dialogue with the public).
Others justify the role of constitutional courts on the basis that
legislatures, from time to time, are only too happy for the judiciary to
step in and take contentious issues off their hands. However, by itself,
this does not explain away the counter-majoritarian difficulty. It has also
been said that a judicial ruling, which may at first glance appear to be
counter-majoritarian, may reflect a policy choice that the majority would
itself adopt if the issue were considered with calmer heads. An
independent judiciary is therefore required to "protect [the people] from
the violence of their own passions. 39
Constitutionalism finds its best justification in the adoption of a
broader notion of democracy. This is entirely justified since democracy
is "never simply the rule of the people but always the rule of the people
within certain predetermined channels, according to certain prearranged
procedures. ' 4 0 Accordingly, majority rule without any constitutional
restraints may, therefore, be anti-democratic. The judiciary, empowered
by the constitution, plays a vital role in upholding the system of checks
and balances necessary for the effective functioning of any democracy.
In a new democracy, "whose structural design is untested,, 41 judicial
monitoring of separation of powers is essential.4 2 Parliament cannot
easily regulate itself and control its own powers. As the Court stated in
City of Boerne v. Flores,4 3 "If Congress could define its powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
44
means.'
History teaches us that "[i]t is popular government and the 'people
themselves ' 'A 5 that may endanger and threaten rights and notions of
justice.46
Religious, racial or ethnic minorities inevitably require
protection from the will of the majority. The very nature of democracy
39. Id. at 829 (quoting 2 SAMUEL CHASE, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 20 (Da Capo
Press 1970) (1805)).
40. Holmes, supra note 36, at 231. It is important to bear in mind that representative
democracy is far from perfect and not always "representative" given problems such as
low polls, the influence of electoral systems on election outcomes, the impact of
lobbyists, corporate campaign funding, self interest, careerism, and racism. See Keith E.
Whittington, An "Indespensable Feature"? Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 6
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 22-27, 30-32 (2002-2003).
41. Stephen ElIman, Separation of Powers in Post Apartheid South Africa, 8 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 455, 481 (1992-1993).
42. Id.
43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
44. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
45. Whittington, supra note 32, at 829 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiser ed., 1961)).
46. See id.
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lends itself to an imbalance in the ability of minorities to partake in
policy debates. It is not infrequent that the majority will be inclined to
make decisions that disproportionately affect minority communities. 7
Finally, it is worth noting that while the legislature may consider the
consequences of its legislation, it is inclined to do so only in the abstract.
The judiciary, however, is uniquely placed to consider the actual impact
and consequence of a statute in the context of an actual case before it.
IV. Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court
A. Makwanyane
Not long after its establishment, the death penalty, an enormously
controversial issue, presented itself to the Constitutional Court. 48 As the
court stated, the question arose in the context of violent crime that had
"reached alarming proportions" '49 and "pose[d] a threat to the transition
to democracy." 50 In State v Makwanyane,51 the court determined the
constitutionality of section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act of
1977,52 which permitted the imposition of the death penalty for murder. 3
At the time, the interim constitution was applicable.
The Constitutional Court was acutely aware the interim constitution
had not been democratically adopted,54 and it was cognizant of the
difficulties which could arise from an unpopular ruling. In this context,
the Constitutional Court can hardly be blamed for its suggestion that the
legislature (in which the ANC, an abolitionist party, held a majority of
seats) ought to have dealt with the issue.
The South African government argued the death penalty was cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishment and that it should be declared
unconstitutional.55 However, the Attorney General, an independent State
institution, argued the death penalty was necessary and did not constitute
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.56 The Constitutional Court
47. See Whittington, supra note 40, at 31-32.
48. See State v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (S. Aft.).
49. Id. at 713-14.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (S.Afr.).
53. Id. s. 277(l)(a) (repealed 1997).
54. As the court noted, the interim constitution was "the product of negotiations
conducted at the Multi-Party Negotiating Process. The final draft adopted by the forum
of the Multi Party Negotiating Process was, with few changes, adopted by Parliament."
Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR at 679
55. See id.at 677.
56. See id. Such treatment was prohibited by section 11(2) of the interim
constitution. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993 § 11(2) ("No person shall be subject to
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unanimously found that the statutory provisions that permitted the
imposition of the death penalty were unconstitutional. 7
The main judgment was written by the President of the
Constitutional Court, Justice Chaskalson; 58 however, each justice wrote a
separate judgment emphasizing different aspects of the debate. In this
way, the court demonstrated its awareness of the importance of the issue
and the difficult role played by the judiciary in the death penalty debate.
In the main judgment, Justice Chaskalson accepted that the majority
of South Africans believed the death penalty ought to be imposed in
extreme cases of murder.5 9 He accepted that public opinion may hold
some degree of relevance, 60 but stated that, by itself, public opinion is no
replacement for the duty vested in the judiciary "to interpret the
[c]onstitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or [favor].,, 6 1 As
he explained, "If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no
need for constitutional adjudication. 6 2 Justice Chaskalson pointed out
the negotiating parties at CODESA had debated the death penalty but
reached no resolution, and this amounted to a delegation of power to the
judiciary. 63 He contended the use of a referendum to determine the issue
cannot
would not protect the weakest and most marginalized "who
64
protect their rights adequately through the democratic process.
Justice Ackermann stressed, "If the death penalty is to be
abolished.., society is entitled to the assurance that the State will
protect it from further harm from the convicted unreformed recidivist
killer or rapist., 65 In his judgment, Justice Didcott emphasized that while
"great attention [must be paid] to public opinion,, 66 it should be borne in
mind that public opinion was based on the fallacious assumption the
death penalty had a significant deterrent effect.67 Justice Kentridge
declared that the Constitutional Court does not determine the
constitutionality of the death penalty because it can "claim a superior
wisdom,, 68 but because the framers of the interim constitution imposed a

torture
subject
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
See Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR at 724.
Id. at 674.
See id. at 703'
See id.
Id.
Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR at 703.
See id. at 680-82.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 732 (Ackermann, J., concurring).
Id. at 739-40 (Didcott, J., concurring).
See Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR at 739-40 (Didcott, J., concurring).
Id. at 741 (Kentridge, J., concurring).

2006]

THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY

duty on the Constitutional Court.69 Justice Kentridge maintained that if
public opinion on the death penalty was clear, it could not ignored, but,
in the present case, it was not expressed in a referendum and was,
therefore, unclear. 70 Justice Mahomed declared that while public opinion
plays a significant role in the determination of policy and political issues,
the judicial process is different, and the court could not avoid the
constitution makers' intention to leave the issue to the judiciary.7 1 Thus,
the approach taken by the Constitutional Court was anything but
consistent. Although some members of the court implicitly recognized
the dispute as a political issue best addressed by the legislature,72 others
simply treated the matter as purely judicial.7 3
Makwanyane provoked an outcry. Opposition leaders criticized the
judgment as out of touch with public opinion, and even some senior
members of the ANC called for a referendum. 74 However, despite some
hesitation, the ANC stood firmly against the death penalty
and did not
rework the final constitution to permit its reintroduction.7 5
B.

Constitutional Certification

After the drafting and approval of the final constitution by the first
elected South African Constitutional Assembly, 76 the Constitutional
Court faced the daunting task of determining the validity of the final
constitution.7 7 Indeed, In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa had no precedent of its kind anywhere in the
world.
Interestingly, although the draft text submitted for ratification was
69. See id.
70. See id. at 745-46 (Kentridge, J., concurring).
71. See id. at 759 (Mahomed, J., concurring).
72. Recognition that the matter was inherently political is evident from the court's
suggestions that public opinion was relevant.
73. Justice Kriegler stated the incumbents of the court "are judges, not sages: their
discipline is the law, not ethics or philosophy and certainly not politics." Makwanyane,
1995 (6) BCLR at 747-48 (Kriegler, J., concurring). The court quoted West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): "The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles ....
Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR at 704 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at
638).
74. See Heinz Klug, Participation in the Design: Constitution-Making in South
Africa, in POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 128, 148-49.

75.
76.
1996.
77.
BCLR
against

Id. at 149.
See id. at 151; see also Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of
See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (10)
1253 (CC) (S. Aft.). The task of the court was to weigh the final constitution
the CPs adopted as part of the interim constitution. Id. at 1264.
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unanimously passed in the Constitutional Assembly,7 8 several of its
supporting parties opposed its certification by the court.79
Commentators, therefore, suggest that a positive vote in the
Constitutional Assembly did not indicate approval of the constitutional
text, but only that the text be sent to the Constitutional Court for
consideration.8 °
Certification placed the Constitutional Court in quandary: refusal to
certify could have placed the democratic transition in jeopardy, while
certification could have undermined the credibility of the Constitutional
Court if the constitution ultimately proved to be unpopular. 8' The
Constitutional Court found the constitutional text largely complied with
the CPs, 82 but nevertheless refused certification because some provisions
conflicted with the CPs.83 However, the Constitutional Court quickly
pointed out that none of the reasons for its refusal 84of certification
constituted significant obstacles to the transition process.
In addressing the issue, the Constitutional Court stated, a little
superficially, it did not exercise a political role by determining the
certification of the constitution. 85 In its words, "[T]he [c]ourt has a
judicial and not a political mandate." 86 To bolster this argument and
justify its role, the Constitutional Court stated it "has no power, no
mandate[,] and no right to express any view on the political choices
made by the [Constitutional Assembly] in drafting the [final

78. See Rickard, supra note 27, at 229. On May 8, 1996, eighty-seven percent of the
Constitutional Assembly voted in favor of the new constitutional text. Id. at 226;
Matthew Chaskalson & Dennis Davis, Constitutionalism, the Rule of Law, and the First
Certification Judgment: Ex Parte the Chairpersonof the ConstitutionalAssembly in Re:
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 13 S. AFR. J. ON HUM.
RTS. 430, 433 n.14 (1997).
79. Rickard, supra note 27, at 299.
80. See id. at 229.
81. See id. at 228.
82. See In re Certificationof the Constitution, 1996 (10) BCLR at 1399.
83. The court found certain provisions were inconsistent with the CPs, including (a)
the failure to grant individual employers the right to collective bargaining; (b) various
provisions which shielded legislation from constitutional review; (c) the failure to
sufficiently protect the independence and impartiality of the Public Protector and Auditor
General; (d) the failure to adequately safeguard the independence and impartiality of the
Public Service Commission (PSC); (e) the failure to specify the powers and functions of
the PSC; (f) the failure to set up a framework for structures of local government; (g) the
failure to require formal legislative procedures in local government; (h) the failure to
allocate appropriate fiscal powers to provincial government and categories of local
government; and (i) the failure to provide provincial powers and functions not
substantially less than or inferior to those in the interim constitution. See id. at 1283,
1308-09, 1312-13, 1317, 1349-50, 1396-98.
84. See id. at 1399.
85. See id. at 1273.
86. Id.
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constitution], save to the extent that such choices may be relevant either
to compliance or non-compliance with the CPs."8 7
The judgment, divided into two parts, 88 reflects a tension in the
89
Constitutional Court's attitude toward counter-majoritarianism.
Initially, the court recognized the difficulty of exercising judicial review
over a constitution drafted by democratically elected representatives.9"
Chaskalson and Davis term this "the political price which had to be paid
for the introduction of democracy into South Africa." 9 Deference to the
democratic process is evident from the court's interpretive stance: "an
interpretative policy which was designed to facilitate certification. 92
Where the constitutional text was capable of more than one reasonable
meaning, one inconsistent and one consistent with the CPs, the court
determined that it would adopt the interpretation consistent with the
CPs. 9 3 However, the Constitutional Court later adopted a strong defense
of constitutionalism.
This approach ultimately won the day and
outweighed its earlier deferential approach. The Constitutional Court
held the constitutional text did not comply with the CPs in nine respects,
although only two violations were clearly necessary to the outcome of
the judgment. 94 The Constitutional Court rejected any provisions of the
draft constitution that "interfered or threatened to interfere with
institutions and mechanisms designed to protect constitutionalism and
the rule of law." 95
Commentators suggest the Constitutional Court's approach reflected
96
its institutional confidence in, as well as the general public acceptance
of,97 its role in the certification process. The role of the judiciary was
linked to the extent of freedom accorded to it by the public, and as some
scholars suggest, this is the norm. 98 Although certification is a striking
instance of the counter-majoritarian dilemma, it arose directly from a

87. In re Certificationof the Constitution, 1996 (10) BCLR at 1273.
88. The first part, chapters 1 and II, considered the role of the court in the
certification process and the second part, chapters III to IV, determined whether each of
the constitutional provisions comply with the CPs. See Chaskalson & Davis, supra note
78, at 432.
89. Id.
90. See In re Certificationof the Constitution, 1996 (10) BCLR at 1274.
91. Chaskalson & Davis, supra note 78, at 433.
92. Id. at 434.
93. See In re Certificationof the Constitution, 1996 (10) BCLR at 1276.
94. Chaskalson & Davis, supra note 78, at 436-39.
95. Id. at 444.
96. Heinz Klug, Introducing the Devil: An InstitutionalAnalysis of the Power of
ConstitutionalReview, 13 S. AFR. J.ON HUM. RTS. 185, 195 (1997).
97. Rickard, supra note 27, at 229-30.
98. See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part
Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 977 (2000).
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compromise between political actors, several of whom held a significant
degree of public confidence. 99
Some commentators suggest the Constitutional Court overstepped
its mandate in its disparaging remarks concerning derogations of rights
during a state of emergency because the particular provision was not
strictly up for scrutiny. 00 However, the comments have been welcomed
by others because they reflect the court's firm commitment to act as the
guardian of fundamental rights and liberties.' 0 '
The certification judgment raised no objection. The losers, the
ANC, remained capable of guiding the debate at the Constitutional
Assembly. The opposition parties were pleased with the second chance
to negotiate the text.' 0 2 The public understood that the court was merely
03
playing a necessary political role and viewed the decision as credible.1
Following the judgment, the text was amended by the Constitutional
Assembly with little difficulty and resubmitted to the Constitutional
Court, who heard the matter and certified the amended text as compliant
with the CPs. Thereafter, the4 amended text was signed into law and
0
became the final constitution.'
C.

Grootboom

The right of access to housing came before the Constitutional Court
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom.105 The case
raised several issues concerning the role of the court and the difficulties
in enforcing socio-economic rights. 10 6 Specifically, the government
argued the judiciary, as an unelected body, lacks legitimacy to determine
the distribution of State resources because such action requires the
exercise of political discretion over policy matters in which it has little
07
expertise or institutional support.
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court considered the right of
access to adequate housing and the nature of the duty on the State. 0 8
Section 26 of the South African Constitution provides: "Everyone has
the right to have access to adequate housing.... The [S]tate must take
99. See In re Certification of the Constitution, 1996 (10) BCLR at 1268-69.
100. See Robin Palmer, Declaration of a State of Emergency: Section 37 of the
Constitution of South Africa, 6 HUM. RTs. & CONST. L.J. S. AFR. 24 (1997).
101. Rickard, supra note 27, at 265-66.
102. Id. at 288.
103. Id. at 288-89.
104. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 35 of 1997.
105. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
106. See id. at 1183.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1181-82.
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reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right."'10 9 Further, section 28
guarantees children the right to shelter,110 a right not limited by internal
qualifiers, IIsuch as progressive realization, or subject to available State
resources.

The case arose after a desperately poor community in the
Wallacedene informal settlement, 1 2 consisting of 390 adults and 510
children,' 13 left the appalling conditions and illegally occupied a site
earmarked for low cost housing.' '4 Following their eviction from the
site, the community settled on a sports field and an adjacent community
hall and applied to the High Court for an order requiring the State to
provide adequate shelter or housing until they obtained permanent
accommodation."'
Although the High Court refused to grant relief under section 26, it
ordered the State to provide the children and parents (relief was therefore
granted only to some of the applicants) with "bare minimum" shelter in
the form of tents and potable water pursuant to section 28.116 The
judgment concentrated on the differences between the two sections and
uncritically adopted the approach taken by the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR) based on17
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.'
The ESCR defined the substance
of the right to adequate housing by
' 8
reference to its "minimum core." "
The State appealed from the High Court to the Constitutional Court,
which took a very different perspective on the matter. The Constitutional
Court defined the issue as one relating to the reasonableness of the
measures taken by the State." 9 The court held that socio-economic
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 26(1-2).
Id. § 28.
Id.
See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR at 1177.
Seeid.at 1176 n.2.
See id.
Seeid.at 1178.

116. See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality & Others 2000 (3) BCLR 227 (C) at
293-95 (S 116.See Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's
Promise, 16 S.Afr. on J. Hum. Rts. 206, 223 n.41 (2000).
Afr.).
117. See Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities ina
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's
Promise, 16 S.AFR. ON J. HUM. RTs. 206, 223 n.41 (2000).
118. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, The
Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art.2,par.]):General Comment 3, 10, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
119. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)
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rights are enforceable in a negative manner,
preventing government from
120
impairing the right to adequate housing.
The Constitutional Court noted that, although the ESCR had
approached the enforcement of socio-economic rights with reference to121a
"minimum core" of rights, it did not define the "minimum core.'
Thus, the Constitutional Court held that the "minimum core" is only one
consideration in determining whether the State has met its constitutional
duty to implement reasonable legislative measures to progressively
achieve the right of access to adequate housing. 122
The Constitutional Court noted the reasonableness standard did not
require consideration of whether the State could have used more
desirable or efficient measures or whether the measure was an
appropriate use of public funds. 23 The court concluded the only
question is whether the State's adopted measures are reasonable. 124 As
the Constitutional Court pointed out, "It is necessary to recogni[z]e that a
wide range of possible
measures could be adopted by the State to meet
125
its obligations."'

The court declared the State had breached its obligation to devise
and implement, within its available resources, a "comprehensive and
coordinatedprogram"' 26 to progressively realize the right of access to
adequate housing. 27 The existing program was inadequate because it
failed to cater for homeless and desperately poor communities such as
the one before the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court deferred to the political branches by
declining to devise the content of the housing plan and by noting that
sections 26 and 28 do not entitle anyone to claim shelter or housing
immediately on demand. Nevertheless, the judgment reflected a shift
forward for the realization of socio-economic rights in South Africa.' 28
BCLR 1169, 1190-91 (CC) (S. Aft.).

120.
121.
122.
123.

See id. at
See id. at
See id at
Seeid. at

124

Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 at 1190-91.

1088-89.
1187.
1188.
1190-91.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 1209 (emphasis added).
127. See id. (referring to requirements of section 26(2)).
128. Grootboom marked a radical shift from Soobramoney v Minister of Health,
KwaZulu-Natal, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (S. Afr.), where the South African
Constitutional Court was extremely deferential to State action. In Soobramoney, the
court refused to require the State to provide life-saving dialysis treatment because of
budgetary constraints. Id. at 1706. The court determined the treatment did not constitute
"emergency medical treatment" as contemplated by section 27(3) of the constitution,
which, according to the court, requires a "sudden catastrophe." Id. at 1703-04. The State
argued the hospital resources only permitted it to provide dialysis to a limited number of
individuals. Id. at 1699. Additionally, the court noted the hospital had excluded
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Commentators praised the court's move from its earlier decision of
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwa-Zulu Natal129 and its
enforcement of socio-economic rights.' 30 However, there was also
disappointment with the court's failure to adopt
the "minimum core"
13
1
relief.
declaratory
than
more
grant
or
approach
D. Treatment Action Campaign
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,'32 the
Constitutional Court was saddled with yet another hot potato. In July
2000, the State decided to implement a program to prevent mother-tochild transmission (MTCT) of HIV. 33 The South African government
began a limited program to provide nevirapine to a limited number of
34
pilot sites, numbering two in each province, for a period of two years.
The government intended to use the information gathered from the sites
to "develop[] a national policy for the extension of the program[] to other
public facilities outside the pilot sites."' 35 However, during the two year
period, State doctors
were not permitted to prescribe nevirapine outside
136
of the pilot sites.
The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a non-governmental
organization, challenged the constitutionality of the government program
in the High Court. 37 The High Court ordered the government to extend
its MTCT program and make nevirapine available to pregnant women
with HIV who give birth in the public sector, and their children, where
38
the woman had received appropriate HIV testing and counseling.
Further, the High Court ordered the State to develop
a comprehensive
139
national program to prevent or reduce MTCT of HIV.
Soobramoney according to rationally and objectively fair criteria. Id. at 1704-05. Thus,
the court concluded it would be "slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good
faith by the political organs." Id. at 1705-06.
129. Id.
130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa,
11 CONST. F. CONSTITUTIONNEL 123, 123 (2000-200 1).
131. See Thomas J. Bollyk, R IF C > P + B: A Paradigmfor Judicial Remedies of
Socio-Economic Rights Violations, 18 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 161, 169 n.46 (2002).

Scholars argue the court should have exercised supervisory jurisdiction and issued an
injunction. See id. at 169.
132. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (1) 2002
(10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Aft.).
133.
134.
135.
136.

137.
BCLR
138.
139.

Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Treatment Action Campaign & Others v Minister of Health & Others 2002 (4)
356 (T) (S. Aft.).
Id. at 386-87.
Id. at 387.
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The State was not thrilled with the decision of the High Court. In a
statement made soon after the judgment, the Minister of Health stated:
If this judgment is allowed to stand it creates a precedent that could
be used by a wide variety of interest groups wishing to exercise quite
specific influences on government policy in the area of socioeconomic rights .... hat happens to public policy if it begins to
be
140

formulated piecemeal fashion through unrelated court judgments?

On appeal to the Constitutional Court, TAC argued the
government's HIV policy was irrational,' 4 1 while the State argued the
High Court order infringed the doctrine of separation of powers. 142 The
State argued its MTCT program was rational and consistent with its
obligations under the constitution. The State put forward a myriad of
policy arguments,143 which the court concluded were unsupported by the
facts.144 Most importantly, the court determined the State could not
argue scarce resources prevented the public distribution of nevirapine
because drug companies
had offered the government nevirapine free of
45
charge for five years. 1
The Constitutional Court noted the constitution expressed the right
of access to health care services separately from the State's obligation to
implement the right progressively through reasonable legislative and

140. See Saras Jagwanth, Democracy, Civil Society and the South African
Constitution:Some Challenges 17 (U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org., Mgmt. of Soc.
Transformations, Discussion Paper No. 65, 2003).
141. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 at 1042. TAC arguments
focused on several issues including the following: (1) the government endorsed
nevirapine and the Medicines Control Council registered nevirapine for use to reduce the
risk of MTCT of HIV; (2) the drug companies offered to supply nevirapine free of charge
for five years; (3) the restriction of nevirapine to the pilot sites discriminated against
women who could not travel to the pilot sites; (4) the restriction allowed doctors in the
private sector to prescribe nevirapine, but prohibited most doctors in the public sector
from doing so. Id. at 1041-42.
142. Id. at 1042-43.
143. See id. at 1050-51.
144. See id. at 1051-54.
145. Id. at 1050. The government argued it designed the pilot project to research the
cost and efficacy of nevirapine. Id. at 1050-51. It was concerned the program could not
effectively prevent the spread of HIV without a provision of substitute breast milk to
prevent the spread of HIV through breastfeeding. Id. Further, the government
considered counseling necessary to overcome the cultural stigma attached to bottle
feeding. Id. Additionally, the government believed the "administration of nevirapine to
the mother and her child might lead to the development of resistance to the efficacy of
nevirapine and related [drugs] in later years." Id. at 1051. Thus, the effective use of
nevirapine required a "comprehensive package," including HIV testing, counseling,
breast milk substitutes, progress monitoring, clean water supplies, and vitamin
supplements. Id. at 1050-51. Therefore, the government claimed the "comprehensive
package" was too costly and could not immediately be realized. Id. at 1051.
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other measures within available resources. 14 6 However, consistent with
47

Grootboom, it held that the provisions should be read together.
Further, the court rejected the argument that the right of access to health
care had a "minimum core," stating it would be impossible to give
everyone access to a "core" service immediately. 48 The Constitutional
Court stated it was not institutionally equipped to make wide ranging
factual and political enquiries necessary for determining the "minimum
core" standards. 149 The court set out its role in the following terms:
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders
could have multiple social and economic consequences for the
community. The [c]onstitution contemplates rather a restrained and
focused role for the courts, namely, to require the State to take

measures to meet its constitutional obligations0 and to subject the
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.15
The Constitutional Court held it was required to determine whether
the MTCT policy constituted a reasonable legislative or other
measure. 5 1 Decisions about the "reasonableness" of State action may
have budgetary implications, but are not aimed at rearranging the
budget. 52 In considering the policy's discriminatory effect on women
without access to pilot sites, the court found the policy failed to meet
constitutional standards because it excluded individuals the State could
have reasonably included in the treatment program. 153 The issue was not
whether the best policy was immediately realizable, but whether the
5 4
government reasonably excluded nevirapine at public health facilities.
The court concluded it was unreasonable to deny mothers and children
nevirapine in public health facilities outside of the pilot sites because
in facilities where
there was no significant cost to administer the drug
55
testing and counseling procedures were in place.'

In response, the State contended the Constitutional Court could not
grant more than a declaratory judgment, stating the policy failed to meet
constitutional standards. 56 It claimed separation of powers gave the
executive a free hand to adapt its policies without interference from the

146.
147.

Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 at 1045.
Id. at 1046.

148.
149.

Id. at 1046-47.

150

Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 at 1047.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1054-55.

155.

Id. at 1055.

156.

Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 at 1061.

Id. at 1047.
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judiciary.1 57 The court rejected the argument, stating the exceptional and
urgent nature of the medical treatment required intervention by the
courts. 158 However, the Constitutional Court carefully noted that orders

political
concerning policy choices must be formulated to not preclude
159
branches from making other legitimate policy decisions.
The Constitutional Court ordered, among other things, the State to
remove restrictions that prevented nevirapine from being made available
at public health facilities that were not research or training sites.1 60 The
court determined the evidence did not support an order for the provision
of formula feed and considered the issue rather complex, with potentially
significant budgetary implications. 161 Most importantly, the court framed
the order in a specific manner that did not "preclude government from
adapting its policy in a manner consistent with the [c]onstitution if
equally appropriate162or better methods become available to it for reducing
[MTCT] of HIV."'
Reconciling the policy decision inherent in the court's remedy with
the notion of separation of powers, although difficult, is not impossible.
This task is made easier by the Constitutional Court's acknowledgment
that it was entering into a policy arena. It acknowledged the legislature
and the executive should be the primary formulator of policy, but stated
this did not mean the "courts cannot or should not make orders that have
an impact on policy" when mandated by the constitution.1 63 The court
looked at foreign law and found instances where a declaration of
unconstitutionality was considered preferable to injunctive relief because
"there are myriad options available to the government that may rectify
the unconstitutionality of the current system."' 64
The court was acutely aware nevirapine was a potentially life saving
drug and South Africa had one of the highest HIV infection rates in the
world.1 65 The case was exceptional in another way: the victims of State
policy were children with no access to the democratic process., 66 These
157.

Id.

158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1063-64.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1072. The State was also ordered to (a) permit and facilitate the use of

nevirapine in public hospitals to HIV-positive mothers who had been prescribed the
medication and counseled, (b) provide counselors trained in the use of the drug to public
hospitals and clinics other than research sites, and (c) take reasonable measures to extend
the testing and counseling facilities at public hospitals and clinics to expedite the use of
nevirapine. Id.
161. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 at 1069-70.
162. Id. at 1072.
163. Id. at 1061-62.
164. Id. at 1065-66.
165. Id. at 1055.
166. Kevin Hopkins, Democracy in a Post-TAC Society, DE REBUS (S. Aft.), Nov.
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extraordinary circumstances justified the court's intrusion into the policy

arena. In any event, by formulating a flexible order, the court's intrusion
did not preclude the State from adjusting or altering policy.
Treatment Action Campaign was hailed as a victory for the sufferers
of HIV in South Africa. 167 It was subsequently said that judgment
reflects that "the [c]onstitution creates a powerful tool in the hands of
civil society, to ensure that the government gives proper attention to the
fundamental needs
of the poor, the vulnerable[,] and the
68
marginalized.'
E.

Fourie

Subsequently, in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie,169 the court
tackled the vexed question of same-sex marriages.1 70 There, the
Constitutional Court determined the constitutionality of the South
African common law definition of marriage and the Marriage Act of
1961 .I The common law defines marriage as "a union of one man with
one woman, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others,"' 72 and the
Marriage Act requires an explicit reference to the words "lawful wife"
and "lawful husband" during the exchange of vows. 173
The State argued it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to
significantly change the institution of marriage and that such changes
should be addressed by the parliament. 174 In its argument, the State drew
on several threads: a) the recognition of same-sex marriages is an
inappropriate solution to discrimination against homosexuals in light of
2002, at 14, 17.
167. See, e.g., Jaspreet Kindra, HIV/AIDS Drugsfor All, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S. Afr.),
Oct. 11, 2002 ("After the TAC's Constitutional Court victory forcing the government to
provide anti-retrovirals to HIV-positive pregnant women, the Cabinet in April announced
that it would also extend the treatment to survivors of sexual assault.").
168. Geoff Budlender, A Paper Dog with Real Teeth, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S. Afr.),
July 12, 2002,
169. Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355

(CC) (S. Afr.).
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 360.
See id.
Id.

173. See Marriage Act 25 of 1961 § 30(1) (S. Afr.). A marriage officer, by default,
must ask the parties the following question:
"Do you, A.B., declare that as far as you know there is no lawful impediment to
your proposed marriage with C.D. here present, and that you call all here
present to witness that you take C.D. as your lawful wife (or husband)?", and
thereupon the parties shall give each other the right hand and the marriage
officer concerned shall declare the marriage solemnized in the following words:
"I declare that A.B. and C.D. here present have been lawfully married."
Id.
174.

Fourie,2006 (3) BCLR 355 at 402.
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less dramatic alternatives; 175 (b) the constitution does not protect the right
to marry; 176 and (c) international
human rights law recognizes only
77
heterosexual marriages. 1
In the majority judgment drafted by Justice Sachs, the
Constitutional Court described gays and lesbians as a "permanent
minority in society" who are exclusively reliant on the Bill of Rights for
their protection. 178 Further, the court noted the parliament had, through
recent legislation, reflected an awareness of the shifting notion of family
in society. 7 9 The court declared that the mere fact that the legal system
"embodies conventional majoritarian views [on homosexuality] in no
way mitigates its discriminatory impact."' 80
The Constitutional Court refused to dismiss religious opposition to
homosexuality lightly, warning that it must not be seen simply as
chauvinism. 18 ' Nevertheless, the court found that religious sentiment
should not obstruct the upholding of fundamental rights. 182 The court
stated that no minister of religion was legally obliged to solemnize 83a
same-sex marriage if that marriage would contradict religious doctrine.
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court had little difficulty in finding that
the common law and statutory obstacles to same-sex marriage were
unconstitutional because they breached, among other things, the right to
equality and the prohibition against unfair discrimination in a manner
84
that did not pass constitutional scrutiny under the limitation clause. 1
However, shaping an appropriate remedy proved more challenging
to the court. 185 The State argued reading in the words "or spouse" into
section 30(1) of the Marriage Act would be inappropriate. 186 It argued:
175. See id. at 388.
176. See id. at 372.
177. See id. at 393. In support of its argument, the State relied on article 16 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides:
(1)Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality
or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to
equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 16, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
178. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 at 363.
179. See id. at 367.
180. Id.at 385.
181. See id. at 390-91.
182. See id. at 392.
183. See Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 at 392.
184. See id. at 398-99.
185. See id. at 399-414.
186. See id. at 402.
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(a) the public should be allowed to debate the issue; (b) the judiciary is
not competent to alter the institution of marriage in such a significant
manner; (c) only the parliament has the power to alter the institution of
marriage in such a dramatic fashion.' 87 It claimed a declaration of
be suspended to
invalidity of section 30(1) of the Marriage Act should
188
remedy.
appropriate
an
find
to
parliament
the
enable
Disagreement among the members of the court regarding an
appropriate remedy led to a split.

89

The majority refused interim relief

and suspended its declaration of invalidity for twelve months to allow the
parliament to remedy the constitutional defect in the Marriage Act. 190
Only if the parliament failed to correct the defect would the words "or
spouse" be read into the statute.' 9' The majority noted the South African
Law Commission had proposed at least two different ways to remedy the
problem. 192 The majority reasoned that it was appropriate for the
parliament, in light of its "democratic and legitimating role," to
determine an appropriate remedy to encourage greater stability in the
93
institution of marriage and greater acceptance of same-sex marriages.'
However, the minority judgment, drafted by Justice O'Regan, held that
reading the words "or spouse" into the Marriage Act would not create
great uncertainty regarding the status
of same-sex marriages or obstruct
94
the legislature in its policy choices. 1
Fourie received a mixed response. It was criticized by some gay
rights organizations for failing to make same-sex marriages immediately
effective and by deferring equality. 95 The ANC welcomed the decision,
calling it "an important step forward,"'' 96 but many other political parties
were not as enthusiastic. 97 Furthermore, churches, including the
Anglican Church, voiced their disappointment with the decision. 98 On
the whole, the public response has not been positive.
Following a heated debate in parliament on November 15, 2006, the
Civil Union Act was passed into law' 99 after the ruling ANC applied a
187. See id.
188. See Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 at 402.
189. See id. at 416.
190. Seeid. at 412-13.
191. Seeid. at413.
192. See id. at 408.
193. See Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 at 416 (O'Regan, J., dissenting).
194. Id.at 417.
195. Jenni Evans, Govt to Respect Gay Marriage Ruling, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S.
Aft.), Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=258227&area=/
breaking.news/breaking-news__national.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Aft.).
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significant amount of pressure on its parliamentary representatives for
support. 200 The Act has been strongly criticized by both conservatives
and liberals alike. Conservatives argue that the law lends itself to
support of sexual perversion. Liberals argue that the Civil Union Act
discriminates against homosexuals because it permits clerics to refuse to
solemnize homosexual marriages, creates a separate and parallel
marriage regime for homosexuals, and requires marriage officers to
inquire whether homosexual couples wish to call their union a marriage
or a civil partnership.2 °1
F.

20
United Democratic Movement

2

In United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of
South Africa & Others,2 °3 the Constitutional Court adopted a strongly
deferential approach in considering a constitutional challenge to
legislation allowing "floor-crossing" by members of Parliament. The
court set the tone for its consideration of the merits of the challenge by
noting that "[t]his case is not about the merits or demerits of the disputed
legislation, [which] is a political question and is of no concern to this
Court. ' 2°4 The court held that if defection is permissible, the details must
be left to parliament.20 5 The court further held that the frustration of the
will of the electorate (by allowing floor-crossing) does not infringe
section 19 of the constitution because all the rights in this section "are
directed to elections, to voting and to participation in political activities.
Between elections, however, voters have no control over the conduct of
their representatives."' 20 6 In addition, the United Democratic Movement
court held, multi-party democracy is not undermined because section
1(d) of the constitution does not prescribe a particular form of electoral
system and the commitment to multi-party democracy is not
incompatible with a system of proportional representation that allows
floor-crossing between elections. 0 7 When it considered the question of
remedy, the court stated further that, in making orders in constitutional
200. Green Light for Gay Marriages, IAFRICA (S. Afr.), Nov. 15, 2006,
http://iafrica.com/pls/cms/iac.page?p-t I=2&pjt2= 1&pjt3=0&p t4=0&pdynamic=YP&
pscontentjid=416904&p site-id=2.
201. South African Council of Churches, Submission to the Portfolio Committee on
Home Affairs (Oct. 9, 2006), available at http://www.sacc-ct.org.za/civiluns.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2007).
202. See generally Brickhill & Babiuch, supra note 5, ch. 45.
203. United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others
(No 2) 2002 (11) BCLR 1179 (CC) (S. Afr.).
204.

Id.

205.
206.

Id. T 47.
Id. ]49.

207.

Id.

lt .

35.
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matters, courts are required to bear in mind the principle of the
separation of powers and, flowing from it, the deference that they owe to
the legislature in devising a remedy.2 °8
Separation of powers and deference are effectively the central
themes of United Democratic Movement. In this respect, the case
provides an excellent example of a judicial approach that, on the face of
it, is highly deferential to Parliament, but the outcome of which
nevertheless arguably fails to promote or protect democratic principles.
While the Court emphasizes that it is for Parliament to design the detail
of the electoral system, the reasoning in United Democratic Movement
reflects a shallow, pluralist conception of the principle of democracy
under the final constitution. It is also at odds with the Court's other dicta
on the nature of South African democracy and the importance of
democratic rights. However, paradoxically, while the decision of the
Court is, in substance, arguably at odds with the democratic
commitments in the constitution, the Court in United Democratic
Movement adopted an approach that was highly deferential to
parliament's democratically superior position.
20 9
G. Doctors for Life

The applicant in Doctorsfor Life210 challenged a cluster of abortionrelated statutes on the grounds that, during the legislative process leading
to their enactment, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and
provincial legislatures had not complied with their constitutional
obligations under sections 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a) of the constitution. In
terms of section 72(1)(a), the NCOP "must... facilitate public
involvement in [its] legislative and other processes ...and [those of] its
committees. '1 1 Section 118(l)(a) imposes a similar obligation on the
provincial legislatures.2 12
At the outset, Justice Ngcobo, writing for the majority, addressed
the issue of separation of powers, noting that this principle is one of the
essential features of South African democracy. 1 3 While the courts must
observe the constitutional limits of their authority, and not interfere in the
processes of other branches of government unless so mandated by the
208. United DemocraticMovement, 2002 (11) BCLR 1179 115.
209. See generally Brickhill & Babiuch, supra note 5, ch. 45.
210. Doctors for Life Int'l v Speaker of the Nat'l Assembly & Others 2006 (12)
BCLR 1399 (CC) (S. Aft.).
211. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 72(a)(1).
212. Justice Ngcobo delivered the judgment of the majority. Justice Sachs filed a
separate concurring judgment, and Justice Yacoob (with the concurrence of Justice
Skweyiya) and Justice Van der Westhuizen filed dissenting judgments.
213. Doctorsfor Life Int'l, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 36.
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constitution, 1 4 the constitution is the supreme law and binds all branches
of government, including parliament.2 15 Accordingly, the court has the
power and responsibility to ensure that parliament fulfils its
constitutional obligations: it would require2 16 clear language in the
constitution to deprive the court of this power.
In relation to the right to vote, a particular version of the countermajoritarian argument has been advanced by some judges of the
Constitutional Court. The argument is that, by interfering in the
legislative process or invalidating legislation adopted by democratically
elected legislative bodies (even if doing so in order to enforce the right to
vote), the court is undermining the right to vote itself.21 7 The court has
found its answer to this concern in the supremacy of the final
constitution. In Doctors for Life, Justice Ngcobo explained:
This Court has emphasi[z]ed on more than one occasion that
although there are no bright lines that separate its role from those of the
other branches of government, "there are certain matters that are preeminently within the domain of one or other of the arms of government
and not the others. All arms of government should be sensitive to and
respect this separation." But at the same time, it has made clear that this
does not mean that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an
impact on the domain of the other branches of government. When
legislation is challenged on the grounds that Parliament did not adopt it
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, courts have to
consider whether in enacting the law in question Parliament has given
effect to its constitutional obligations. If it should hold in any given case
that Parliament has failed to do so, it is obliged by the Constitution to say
so. And insofar as this constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the
legislative branch of government, that is an intrusion mandated by the
Constitution itself. What should be made clear is that when it is
appropriate to do so, courts may-and if need be2must-use
their powers
8
to make orders that affect the legislative process. ,
Like United DemocraticMovement, Doctorsfor Life is a case that
concerns, substantively, the powers of parliament and principles of
democracy to which the constitution is committed. However, in Doctors
for Life, the court effectively concluded that the right of public
participation in the law-making process weighs more heavily in the
214. Id. 37.
215. Id. 38.
216. Id.
217. Id. f 339 (Yacoob, J., dissenting); id. 1 239 (Sachs, J., concurring).
218. Doctors for Life Int'l, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 199 (citing Minister of Health &
Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 98 (CC) (S.
Afr.)) (footnotes omitted).
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South African democracy than the need for the court to defer to a
democratically elected parliament on such issues.
V.

Constitutional Court & Counter-Majoritarianism

This part will explore the following issues: (a) the extent of the
counter-majoritarian difficulty in South Africa; (b) the court's approach
to the counter-majoritarian difficulty; and (c) the methods available to
the court to minimize the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
Does the counter-majoritariandifficulty truly exist? Some scholars
have sought to diminish the tension between democracy and
constitutionalism, arguing that in South Africa non-majoritarianism is
democratically legitimate. Their argument is premised on the alleged
existence of popular consent to constitutional review and the deliberate
allocation of an activist role to the judiciary. 219 These scholars would
claim that "[t]he [c]onstitution has a greater democratic pedigree than
ordinary legislation., 220 However, the CPs, as a product of political
compromise and negotiation between unelected and unmandated
delegates, bound the drafting of the final constitution and accordingly
diminished its democratic credentials. 22' In the absence of a referendum,
it is hard to say whether the political compromises reflected the will of
the people. Speculation aside, we know that the vast majority of elected
representatives adopted the political compromise in the final constitution
and there were no significant public protests against the adoption of the
final constitution.
How has the Constitutional Court reacted to the countermajoritariandifficulty? One notes that the views of the legislature are
not always in sync with the beliefs of the electorate. This was evident in
the constitutional cases discussed.
It is also apparent that the
Constitutional Court has not been significantly swayed by public or
legislative opinion. It ruled against the political branches in several of
the cases and faced strong public opposition in Fourie and Makwanyane.
There was also a measure of public opposition to the decision in Doctors
for Life.
Regrettably, in Makwanyane and Fourie, the Constitutional Court
also displayed some indecision. It vacillated in the face of strong public
opposition. In Fourie, the court demonstrated its uncertainty as to the
219. See Jeremy Sarkin, The PoliticalRole of the South African ConstitutionalCourt,
114 S. AFR. L.J. 134, 138 (1997); see also Davis, supra note 2, at 11-14.
220. Christopher J. Roederer, Dennis the Menace: Post-Structuralist Dabbler or
Constructive Interpreter?, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 177, 191 (2001) (reviewing DENNIS DAVIS,
DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1999)).

221.

92, 112.

See Osborne & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 701-02; Matua, supra note 5, at 81,
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appropriate degree of deference that should be accorded to the
parliament. Fourie appears to be a fearless and bold ruling, but its
justification for refusing relief is without real substance. Granting
interim relief would not have created any obstacles for the parliament
whereas refusing the relief perpetuated unfair discrimination for twelve
months.
Makwanyane in retrospect represents a missed opportunity to work
out a consistent view on the institutional role of the judiciary. Despite
the authors' personal approval of the judgment, there is a compelling
argument that the court overstepped the mark. The legal elements of the
death penalty debate did not diminish its broader political character. The
court acknowledged this by its recognition that public opinion was
relevant.2 2
Furthermore, there was no express constitutional
requirement that the court determine the issue. 223 The public was
224
therefore entitled to input in the resolution of the death penalty issue

through a referendum or a critique of elected representatives (had they
repealed the offensive legislation). Greater respect ought to have been
given to constitutionally-entrenched democratic norms. It may be that
the parliament hoped the institutional legitimacy of the court, coupled
with its reasoning abilities, would sway public opinion. If this was the
case, it was irresponsible given the adverse impact the decision has had
on the credibility of the court. The only justification for the ruling lies in
the fact it was capable of being reversed through the drafting of the final
constitution.
If the majoritarian perspective is constituted by the most popularly
held view, then it is hard to view Grootboom and Treatment Action
Campaign as counter-majoritarian. Both generally received a warm
public reception. In Grootboom, the court carefully minimized its
potential conflict with the parliament by rejecting the ECSR
Committee's approach that the State must devote all the resources at its
disposal to the realization of the right and satisfy the "minimum core
content" of the socio-economic right regardless of resources. 5 The
court avoided an interpretive approach that would, almost inevitably,
have placed it at odds with the political branches. However, its stance
also means that individuals have no constitutionally enforceable right to

222. See State v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665, 739-40, 745-46, 757
(CC) (S. Afr.) (Didcott, Kentridge & Mahomed, JJ., concurring).
223. The court may have found ways to defer any decision on the death penalty to the
parliament through the constitution or other restrictive techniques.
224. Indeed, as the court pointed out, the public has traded its right to self-help in
exchange for protection from the State. See id. at 731 (Ackermann, J., concurring).

225.

See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)

BCLR 1169, 1187-88 (CC) (S. Aft.).
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adequate housing.
Treatment Action Campaign was based primarily on equal
protection reasoning because the State made nevirapine available at some
sites but not others.226 The Constitutional Court took care to ensure that
its remedy did not fix policy in a rigid manner that might have created
unnecessary obstacles for the parliament. 227 Although the court went
further than Grootboom, it still acted with self restraint, fully aware of its
own institutional limits.
The adoption of the reasonableness standard of review, in relation to
socio-economic rights, as opposed to fleshing out the "minimum core,"
has been criticized for denying individuals an immediate claim to relief
from the State. On the other hand, the court's approach is not as limited
as it first appears, and it has applied a high level of scrutiny in relation to
government's resource and policy justifications.22 8 The State is obliged
to take reasonable legislative and other measures to achieve the right.
The court will assess whether the legislative and other measures are
reasonable in light of principles such as comprehensiveness,
transparency, effective implementation, and short term provision for
those in urgent need.229
United Democratic Movement and Doctors for Life provide a
compelling illustration of cases in which a substantive commitment to
democracy can justify (anti-democratic) judicial intrusion into the
legislative sphere. In both cases, arguably the threat to democracy posed
by state action (in United Democratic Movement, by floor-crossing
legislation and in Doctors for Life by legislative neglect for public
participation in the law-making process) is far greater than the threat to
democracy posed by the court's intervention.
How can the court minimize the counter-majoritariandifficulty?
There are numerous mechanisms at the court's disposal to avoid
unnecessary intrusions into the policy and political arena. For instance,
the court could expand the use of the courtroom as a forum for
democratic deliberation by extending rules of standing. Further, the
court may fashion remedies in restrictive terms,23 ° continuing to set out
226. See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (1)
2002 (10) BCLR 1033, 1048 (CC) (S. Afr.).

227.

See id. at 1066.

228.

See Sandra Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social

Rights in South Africa, ESR REV. (S. Afr.), Nov. 2005, at 3, 6.
229. Id. In Rail Commuters Action Group & Others v Transnet Ltd., 2005 (4) BCLR
301 (CC) (S. Aft.), the court pointed out that reasonableness also required a consideration
of "the nature of the duty, the social and economic context in which it arises,.., the
extent of any threat to fundamental rights[,]... [and] the intensity of the harm that may
result." Id. at 337.
230. Section 172 provides, among other things, that courts "must declare that any law
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only the required reasonable standards and leaving the legislature to
provide greater safeguards. It may draw remedies that are the least
obstructive to the legislature and ensure flexibility in the order, thereby
allowing the political branches to make necessary policy shifts. In
certain contexts, where the policy and budgetary implications are
dramatic, the court may be inclined to adopt only negative methods of
enforcement of socio-economic rights.
However, there are also instances where the Constitutional Court
should refuse to grant relief. This includes instances where relief cannot
be properly molded or where other interests preclude an order or where
the interests of justice are outweighed by the disorder 23or administrative
difficulties that would result from the issue of an order. '
Constitutional interpretation plays a crucial role in the court's
ability to avoid entering into the political arena. The Constitutional
Court is required to adopt a purposive approach to interpretation.2 32 But
this does not eliminate the problem as explained by Justice Kentridge in
State v Zuma:
While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the
[c]onstitution... well aware of the fallacy of supposing the general
language must have a single "objective" meaning. Nor is it easy to
avoid the influence of one's personal intellectual and moral
preconceptions.., the constitution does not mean whatever we might
wish it to mean ....If the language used by the lawgiver is ignored
in [favor] of a general 233
resort to "values" the result is not
interpretation but divination.
The limitation clause,234 which ought to guide interpretation of
appropriate limitations on rights, is not always of assistance. It has been
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its
inconsistency." S. AFR.CONST. 1996 § 172(1)(a). Courts may issue any order that is just
and equitable, including those that limit the retrospective effect of a declaration of
invalidity or suspend a declaration to allow any competent authority to correct the defect.
Id. § 172(1)(b).
231. See Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355,
417-18 (CC) (S. Aft.).
232. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39. As Roederer puts it, the approach assumes that
"the legislators' intention is captured by the plain meaning of the words they chose to
enact. Since the legislators are democratically accountable and the judges are not, judges
should yield to these democratic choices." Roederer, supra note 220, at 184.
233. State v Zuma & Others 1995 (4) BCLR 401,412 (CC) (S. Aft.).
234. Section 36(1) provides that rights may be limited by a law of general application,
the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account (a) the nature of the right,
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation, (c) the nature and extent of the
limitation, (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and (e) less restrictive
means to achieve the purpose. S. AFR.CONST. 1996 § 36(1).
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noted, for instance, that the phrase "open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom" contains a "clutch of inherently
contested concepts" and is capable of varied interpretation.2 35
VI.

Conclusion

The Constitutional Court may be the highest court of appeal in
constitutional matters, but we must not forget the special constitutional
role of the democratically elected parliament among the three branches
of government. Besides, the constitution entrenches democratic norms
and the doctrine of separation of powers.236 In formulating a proper
approach to the issue, it must be borne in mind that the legislature, for
numerous reasons, does not necessarily reflect the will of the people.237
Corporations are sometimes so powerful that they may threaten
governments.238 Parliament may believe that it has no choice but to defer
to domestic elites or international financial institutions. Parliament may
239
also "prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view."
Furthermore, in recent times the influence of the legislature has declined
relative to the executive. 24o However, in the face of all this uncertainty,
we do know that the judiciary is relatively independent and holds a
progressive constitutional mandate.
Regrettably many South Africans do not yet readily recognize the
virtues of constitutionalism. 24 1 A study done in 1996 and 1997 found
that South Africans have an ambivalent attitude toward the
Constitutional Court, that only a narrow majority believe the
Constitutional Court could generally be trusted, and that, if the court
makes unpopular decisions, many believe the court should be
abandoned.24 2 Accordingly, in spite of widespread academic acclaim
235. Dennis Davis, Democracy and Integrity: Making Sense of the Constitution, 14 S.
AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 127, 132 (1998) (citing DENISE MEYERSON, READING THE
CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE LENS OF PHILOSOPHY (1998)).

236. Section 7(2) requires the State to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the rights
in the Bill of Rights. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 7(2).
237. Models of representative democracy are not particularly "representative" given
problems such as low polls, the influence of electoral systems on election outcomes, the
impact of lobbyists, corporate campaign funding, self interest, careerism, and racism. See
Robert Mattes, The Myths of Majoritarianism: Understanding Democracy in a New
South Africa (Inst. for Democracy in S. Afr., Occasional Paper No. 43, 1992).
238. Stephen Ellman, A Constitutional Confluence: American "State Action" Law
and the Application of South Africa's Socio-Economic Rights Guarantees to Private
Actors, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 21, 62 (2001-2002).
239. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 25.
240. Sandra Liebenberg, Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social
Rights 11 (Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, Working Paper No. 8, 2005).
241. Van Huysteen, supra note 2 1, at 1.
242. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy,
PopularAcceptance, and the South African ConstitutionalCourt, J. POL., Feb. 2003, at 1,
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(locally and internationally), the court has "relatively low legitimacy, at
least as compared to other high courts; its legitimacy varies across racial
groups; and most important, that the Constitutional Court is able to
convert its legitimacy into acquiescence only in some circumstances and
only with some groups. 243 A study in 2002 concluded that sixty percent
of South Africans agree that the "constitution expresses the values and
aspirations of the South African people. 244 Furthermore, the study
concludes that belief in the legitimacy of the constitution is statistically
no different than it was four years earlier. While the results of the study
arguably reflect a need for popular education on the role of the
constitution and the Constitutional Court, regardless of their underlying
cause, the opinions reflected in the study should not be lightly
disregarded.
Many argue that the efficacy of courts lies in their institutional
legitimacy and the achievement of moral authority that permits them to
make unpopular decisions.2 45 It may be also argued that the legitimacy
of the Constitutional Court flows from the fact that it seeks to implement
the constitution.
The legitimacy of the Constitutional Court is
intrinsically linked to the legitimacy of the constitution and neither
should be taken for granted. The relatively low popular legitimacy of the
Constitutional Court requires that it tread more cautiously when seriously
contentious and inherently political issues arise. The death penalty issue
springs to mind. It is hard to accept constitutional "interpretation" when
one is aware that in reality the constitutional framers deadlocked on the
death penalty. The issue required debate and resolution in a democratic
forum. Parliament was best placed to mediate a long term solution for a
society deeply divided on the death penalty. Such an issue can only be
finally resolved by an actor with unshakable legitimacy-courts "shape
rather than resolve disputes., 246 By intervening, the court merely created
a credibility deficit for itself. The nascent constitutional order must be
considered fragile until it is evident that "the people" have fully
embraced it. We are reminded of the comment that "courts, in so-called
rifled democracies, should opt for a role as an applier of the law and not
seek a role as an equal player in the articulation of societal values. 247
Although the adjudicative process is ill-suited to finally determining

2.
243.

Id. at 3.

244.

Robert Mattes et al, Democratic Governance in South Africa: The People's View

2-3 (Afrobarometer, Paper No. 24, 2003).

245. Id. at 2.
246. Whittington'supra note 32, at 798.
247. R. Gavison, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 703-07 (Vicki C. Jackson &
Mark V. Tushnet eds., 2006).
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"polycentric" issues (i.e. issues which cannot be determined separately to
other matters not before the court),24 8 it is not an invitation to create false
pretexts to avoid granting appropriate relief that is just and equitable.
The denial of relief in United Democratic Movement presents an image
of a court that relies on the counter-majoritarian argument to come to a
substantive conclusion that is itself, arguably, contrary to democratic
principles. Furthermore, there is an air of fragility in the Makwanyane
ruling. Even if the court could not avoid ruling on the death penalty
issue, its political role, apparent to the public, should have been
conceded. This would have allowed for greater dialogue with public
opinion on the death penalty. The court regrettably took refuge behind
its institutional legal position. 249 The current jurisprudence, reflected by
the United DemocraticMovement, Fourie, and Makwanyane rulings does
not engage the public and is unlikely to win its confidence. Perhaps, in
these highly contested areas of public opinion, entering the arena of
public debate would not have assisted the Court in deciding the cases,
but greater engagement with the popular dialogue was possible.
Arguably, the court in United Democratic Movement and Fourie was
excessively deferential to parliament.
In respect of socio-economic rights, one may make a compelling
argument that the court has been excessively deferential to the political
branches. This deference is apparent from the court's refusal to entertain
the minimum core approach to enforcement of socio-economic rights as
well as its refusal to use exercise supervisory jurisdiction. 250 Treatment
Action Campaign marks a change in direction with the court showing
that it will not shy away from shaping policy. There must be less
deference in this area. Activism in this area is unlikely to harm the
credibility of the court among the indigent and is entirely justifiable
given that "those who would benefit from [socio-economic rights] lack
25
political power., '
Socio-economic rights may call on the judiciary to intrude into the
traditional legislative domain, but protection of socio-economic rights is
essential for popular political participation.25 2 From this perspective,
248. 2 THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82 (Rosemary Lyster &
Cora Hoexter eds., 2002).
249 Max du Plessis, Between Apology and Utopia-The Constitutional Court and
Public Opinion, 18 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 1, 14 (2002).
250. Through such jurisdiction the court monitors the implementation of its own
orders. In Treatment Action Campaign, the court stated it may make both declaratory and
mandatory orders and exercise supervisory jurisdiction. See Minister of Health & Others
v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033, 1066 (CC) (S. Afr.).
251. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 124.
252. See Darrel Moellendorf, Reasoning About Resources: Soobramoney and the
Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 327, 332 (1998);
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effective judicial remedies for socio-economic rights are not countermajoritarian.
In cases that turn on substantive principles related to democracy,
such as United Democratic Movement and Doctors for Life, the
Constitutional Court has to walk a seemingly paradoxical tightrope and
adopt an approach, on the one hand, reflecting appropriate deference and
respect for legislation made by a democratic parliament; while, on the
other hand, giving sufficient weight and protection to substantive
democratic principles and rights such as the right to vote. In a sense, in
such cases the court may have to "act counter-majoritarian" in order to
protect the majoritarian democracy that the constitution creates by
striking down laws that threaten that democracy. In our view, when the
court does so, it is not biting off its nose to spite its face-quite the
opposite, its intrusions are generally supportive of democracy!
The function of the Constitutional Court, although ostensibly
counter-majoritarian at times, is ultimately supportive of democracy and
seeks to legitimate the constitution (and, by implication, the role of the
court itself). The court has striven to establish a body of principles
setting out its institutional role in relation to the legislature and to
reconcile that role with counter-majoritarian objections-this process
continues. However, the court's role as upholder of the constitution
(including the upholder of constitutional democratic principles) often
requires its intrusion into legislative terrain. It upholds protections that
ensure democratic process and protects minority rights against the will of
the majority. When doing so, however, the court has been alive to the
tension between its intervention to protect democracy and the potential
(at least in public opinion) threat to democracy that its intrusion presents.
In sum, no better exposition of South African constitutionalism exists but
253
to describe it as "mutually supportive and in tension with democracy.,

Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic
Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 451,461 (1992).
253. See Osborne & Sprigman, supra note 2, at 700.

